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Abstract 
Based on the economic analysis of subjective well-being, policy proposals in two 
areas, i.e. unemployment and status seeking behavior have been raised. We discuss 
the suggestion that due to the high psychic costs of individual unemployment, 
unemployed people should be helped more. Considerations refer to the functionality 
of experienced pressure in order to maintain a generous benefit system, the 
consequences of employment protection for employment and the missing institutional 
approach. The proposal of taxing status seeking in relative income and consumption is 
assessed based on traditional distorting effects like tax evasion and working in the 
shadow economy as well as based on the switching to status competition in other 
(potentially less productive) dimensions. An alternative perspective would compare 
institutions in their capacity to deal with individuals’ positional concerns. 
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Only a few years ago, most economists took it for granted that utility cannot possibly 
be measured, and not even reasonably be approximated. Things have dramatically 
changed: Happiness research has made great progress, with economists playing a 
leading role. In certain respects the changes may be interpreted as “revolutionary” (as 
argued in Frey 2008). Not surprisingly, the economics of happiness has become a 
“hot” topic in which many economists engage, particularly young ones. This is an 
indication in which direction the discipline of economics is likely to evolve.  
There are several surveys of the state of happiness economics available in the form of 
journal articles (e.g. Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006, Frey and Stutzer 2002b, Stutzer 
and Frey 2010) and books (e.g., Bruni and Porta 2005, 2007, Easterlin 2010, Frey and 
Stutzer 2002a, 2013, Layard 2005, van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004). This 
article therefore does not intend to provide a survey of the state of research. Rather it 
deals with specific policy issues related to the new insights gained. The field is vast. It 
ranges from the fundamental question whether happiness is the ultimate goal of 
people, and whether other goals such as loyalty, responsibility, self-esteem, freedom, 
or personal development may also matter to people, and whether it can be subsumed 
under the label of an extended concept of happiness. We leave this issue open here 
and focus on more practical, economic policy aspects following from empirical 
happiness research. Thereby we are interpreting measures of reported life satisfaction 
and happiness as proxy indicators for individual welfare. 
We restrict ourselves to two issues that exemplify well the challenges faced in 
economics by the new insights gained. 
The first issue refers to unemployment. Traditionally, economists considered 
unemployment as a social bad. The economic policy proposals made by Keynes and 
his followers were an effort to overcome this ill and to establish full employment. But 
things changed dramatically with the advent of new classical macroeconomics. This 
school argues that all unemployment is voluntary: those not working just refuse to do 
so at the prevailing wage rate. The most important reason why the reservation wage is 
higher than the prevailing wage is that unemployment benefits are too high. People 
prefer not to work and to cash in these benefits. We will show that the results of 
happiness research in economics differ in two significant respects: (1) Unemployed 
people are much less satisfied with life than those in work, even if the lower income 
available to them is statistically taken into account. For people in the work force, not 
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to work, or to have more leisure, is on average not a beneficial alternative but rather 
imposes significant psychic costs. (2) Unemployment reduces the subjective well-
being not only of those persons actually out of work or unemployed but also those in 
work.  
The second issue refers to the importance of status or relative position as 
determinants of people’s happiness. Happiness research suggests that it is a basic 
human trait that individuals compare themselves to others in a better position. In 
particular, they suffer a loss in well-being because they compare themselves to 
persons with higher income. This effect can be mitigated or even overcome by heavily 
taxing high-income earners. We discuss whether such a proposal makes sense. 
The first section deals with the new insights concerning unemployment. The second 
section discusses the taxation proposal to deal with the negative externalities 
produced by status considerations. The last section draws conclusions. 
I. New Insights into Unemployment 
Unemployment Reduces Subjective Well-Being 
Unemployment first of all reduces the individual well-being of those personally 
affected. In their innovative work for Britain, Clark and Oswald (1994, p. 655) 
summarize their results as follows: “Joblessness depresses well-being more than any 
other single characteristic including important negative ones such as divorce and 
separation.” For Germany, based on individual panel data, Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann (1998) find a negative effect of personal unemployment on life 
satisfaction that would require a sevenfold increase in income to compensate. 
Importantly, in these two analyses, indirect effects (like income losses) that may, but 
need not, accompany personal unemployment are kept constant. Being unemployed 
therefore has psychic costs over and above the potential decrease in the material 
living standard.1  
High unemployment rates also have non-negligible effects on people who are not 
personally affected by unemployment. Based on survey data from population samples 
                                                
1 For references and a discussion of psychological and social factors determining the drop in 
life satisfaction of people who become unemployed, see Frey and Stutzer (2002a: 95–109). 
The specific effect of social work norms on unemployed people’s subjective well-being is 
studied empirically in Clark (2003) and Stutzer and Lalive (2004). 
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from European Union member countries between 1975 and 1992, Di Tella, 
MacCulloch, and Oswald (2003) show that aggregate unemployment decreases 
average reported life satisfaction even if personal unemployment is kept constant. The 
cumulative costs of unemployment are substantial. According to their estimation, the 
average individual in the working population would have to be compensated with 
approximately $200 to offset the loss in life satisfaction caused by a typical U.S.-size 
recession (that is, a recession that entails a 1.5 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate).2 
The question that naturally arises is why even people who are employed feel so much 
less satisfied with their lives when unemployment rates increase. 
Costs of High Unemployment for the Employed 
The potential reasons that explain why workers’ well-being decreases when 
unemployment rates increase can be divided into two broad categories: First, a high 
rate of unemployment may have general negative effects on society that affect 
everybody in a region. Such reasons include not only the direct effects of 
unemployment on crime and public finances, but also the general increase in income 
inequality within a society—an increase that may have the effect of triggering 
workers’ empathy with the unemployed. Second, high unemployment rates affect 
factors specific to people’s individual workplaces. These reasons include changes in 
working hours and salaries and most likely a change in the actual and perceived 
probability of job loss. 
General effects of unemployment on society. Unemployment leads to social problems 
that affect people in general. For example, higher unemployment has been observed to 
increase crime (see, for example, Oester and Agell 2007, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 
2001). In Germany, right-wing crime is positively correlated with regional 
unemployment rates (Falk et al. 2011). If higher crime rates are reflected in lower 
reported well-being, this contributes to the statistical relationship between 
unemployment rates and subjective well-being. High unemployment also has fiscal 
                                                
2 Interestingly, there are systematic differences in the experienced reduction in life 
satisfaction. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) find that the sensitivity to unemployment differs 
according to individuals’ political orientation. Left-wing voters care more about 
unemployment (relative to inflation) than do right-wing voters. 
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effects that may worry the general population. In particular, if unemployment rates are 
as high as they were in many European countries in the second half of the 1990s, the 
fiscal burden may rise to a level that concerns the working population. These general 
effects are expected to influence all workers alike independent of, for example, their 
sectoral employment. 
People also care about the well-being of others and about inequality within a society. 
Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) present evidence for Germany that people of all income 
classes report lower life satisfaction when regional income inequality increases. This 
may be due to inequality aversion and/or to empathy for the poor. Similarly, if 
economic shocks increase unemployment, people may care about the fate of the 
people who experience unemployment, reducing their own sense of well-being. 
Effects of unemployment on economic security. High unemployment rates have effects 
on individuals’ contemporaneous and future economic situations. In times of high 
unemployment, the pressure on salaries increases, leading to lower average wages 
(see the literature on the wage curve by, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald 
1994). Because income correlates positively with people’s well-being, depressed 
salaries lead to a lower life satisfaction in times of high unemployment. Moreover, 
working conditions may become harsher in times of high unemployment. In 
particular, actual working hours may rise in recessions as firms cut costs and fear of 
redundancy and scarcity of alternative job opportunities enable firms to force 
employees to work more hours than they would prefer (see Stewart and Swaffield 
1997, for Britain). This reduces people’s leisure time—sometimes without financial 
compensation.  
The above-mentioned effects on salaries and working hours refer to realized 
consequences. However, high unemployment also affects anticipated economic 
distress, as, for instance, the probability that a worker may himself experience a spell 
of unemployment in the future increases. A large literature documents the importance 
of self-reported job security on individuals’ well-being (see, for example, De Witte 
1999, Duncan Gallie et al. 1998, Green 2006). Moreover, people may also expect 
salary decreases, reduced promotion opportunities and fewer possibilities to change 
jobs. 
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In an empirical study Luechinger et al. (2010) isolate the latter source of reduced 
individual welfare: the negative anticipatory feelings of angst and stress due to 
economic insecurity. In order to distinguish between general negative externalities of 
unemployment and changes in economic risks to individuals, workers are studied in 
two sectors of the economy that differ fundamentally in their exposure to economic 
shocks — people working in the private sector and those working in the public sector. 
Public sector employees usually enjoy extended protection from dismissal and work 
in organizations that very rarely go bankrupt. Thus, for institutional reasons these 
workers face a reduced risk of losing their jobs in comparison with workers in the 
private sector. The empirical analysis uses data from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel for West Germany between 1984 and 2004. During this period, West Germany 
experienced large differences and fluctuations in regional unemployment rates — 
from around 4 percent to almost 20 percent. These fluctuations in the unemployment 
rate over a long period of time allow the authors to identify any sectoral differences in 
workers’ sensitivity to unemployment. Moreover, the panel aspect of the data allows 
to control for individual heterogeneity. The general results show that people working 
in the private sector are affected more strongly by general economic shocks than are 
those working in the public sector. The life satisfaction of private sector employees 
decreases substantially when unemployment rates are high. People working in the 
public sector experience much smaller changes in their well-being in response to 
fluctuations in unemployment rates. Private sector employees’ life satisfaction is 
reduced by 0.56 points (on a scale between 0 and 10) when regional unemployment 
rises from the lowest value in the sample to the highest value — similar to the effect 
of becoming personally unemployed. In comparison, the negative effect on public 
sector employees is about a third lower than for private sector employees. For the 
public servants — a particularly well-protected subgroup of all public sector 
employees - no negative correlation is found whatsoever between regional 
unemployment and reported life satisfaction. These findings hold after controlling for 
differences in the wage structure and working conditions in the two sectors, as well as 
for demographic characteristics and time-invariant individual heterogeneity. Overall, 
the results suggest that a substantial fraction of the psychic costs brought about by 
general unemployment is due to increased economic insecurity. 
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Consequences for Economic Policy 
Research on happiness has identified two major differences to standard economics. 
The first is that unemployment is not simply an underutilization of resources and not 
simply a decision between choosing to stay employed (at a low wage), and becoming 
unemployed (with unemployment benefits). Rather, individuals experience a loss in 
well-being when being unemployed beyond the reduction in income involved. The 
second major difference to standard economics is that the utility losses experienced go 
beyond the persons actually unemployed. Persons with a job are also negatively 
affected by a higher unemployment rate, one important reason being increased 
economic insecurity.  
The two differences imply that unemployment involves greater losses in individuals’ 
welfare than considered so far in economics. Accordingly, we recommend policy 
choices that give relatively more weight to employment than, for example, inflation 
and even economic growth if there is a trade-off. However, one should not jump to 
conclusions with regard to specific policy interventions for at least three reasons.  
(1) Reduced subjective well-being of unemployed people in terms of psychic costs 
due to an internalized work norm or social pressure in areas with a strong social 
work norm can be considered functional. The psychic costs are functional or even 
necessary to maintain a generous benefit system financially sustainable.  
(2) Based on the evidence cited, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether job 
protection should be increased. While increased job protection might benefit 
insiders (see, for example, Clark and Postel-Vinay 2009), it is also likely to make 
employers more reluctant to hire new workers, leading to longer individual 
unemployment spells and to higher general unemployment. 
(3) Policy recommendations from happiness research (like other research in 
economics) are of limited value if they are not connected to institutions. The 
welfare costs of unemployment need to be analyzed for alternative institutional 
arrangements following a constitutional approach (as proposed in Frey and 
Stutzer 2012). A comparative analysis provides information to citizens so that 
they can better pursue their ideal of a social insurance system protecting them 
against some of the consequences of economic shocks. 
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The latter argument together with the existing insights from happiness research in 
economics puts forward the agenda for future research: Work on the evaluation of 
labor market institutions should give more weight to their consequences for employed 
and unemployed individuals’ welfare. So far, little is known about the institutions that 
determine the vulnerability of the economy to shocks in terms of life satisfaction. In a 
longitudinal sample of the European Union, more generous unemployment benefits 
are found to correlate positively with subjective well-being in the general population 
(Di Tella et al. 2003). Based on the same data from the Eurobarometer, the negative 
effects of individual and general unemployment on reported life satisfaction are found 
to be larger in countries with low job protection (Becchetti et al. 2010).   Future 
research will extend the scarce but interesting findings in this area.  
II. Status and Taxation  
This section discusses a proposal derived from one of the major results of economic 
happiness research: People do not value the absolute level of their income but 
compare their economic standing to others. People try to get ahead of their peers with 
regard to their income and consumption. Accordingly, they allocate their time, effort 
and risk taking. While each individual optimizes given his or her preferences, he or 
she does not take into account that other people are made worse off as their relative 
standing falls in the individual’s effort to gain status. The individual optimization thus 
tends to lead to a socially wasteful race for ever higher income and consumption, at 
the end of which everybody is worse off. 
In short, positional externalities occur when the rise in one person’s rank decreases 
the utility of other persons. Several economists, notably Layard (2005, 2006) and 
Robert Frank (1999), have emphasized the zero sum nature of social status. When one 
person’s position rises, the relative status of other persons falls correspondingly and 
the group as a whole, or society, is no better off. When status comes through income 
and someone is made happier as the result of a salary increase, other persons’ income 
automatically decreases in relative terms. The same happens for specific goods and 
services important to one’s position in society. Someone owning such a good (for 
instance, a fancy sports car) imposes a negative external effect on all other people 
who do not own such a good (Frank 2003) and that overall happiness may stay 
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constant. In that case, there is a positional treadmill where the effort of any particular 
person to rise relative to the others does not produce any gain for society overall. 
As a result, the expenditure of resources to produce and sell such goods is socially 
wasteful, because it does not raise social well-being. It then appears beneficial to 
impose a high tax on higher income and on the consumption of positional goods, to 
discourage people from engaging in such zero-sum (or even negative-sum) status 
competition.  
The research on happiness has indeed found empirical evidence that an individual’s 
happiness level is reduced when the average income of other persons increases (see 
e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2002a, chapter 4, Frey 2008, chapter 3)3. There is also 
convincing circumstantial evidence suggesting the same externality with respect to 
consumption, especially for luxury goods (Frank 1985a, 1997, 1999).4  
According to standard welfare economics, a tax may be warranted when an activity 
(here the effort to increase income or consumption) imposes negative external effects 
on other people. The government should intervene to undo the welfare-decreasing 
status race. The proposal to (highly) tax positional externalities has been advanced in 
particular by Frank (1999) and Layard (2006).5 In Layard’s model, the optimal linear 
income tax arising from the positional externality is equal to the negative effect of the 
average income of others on individuals’ subjective well-being. This latter effect can 
be approximated by econometric estimates as has been done for various countries and 
periods. The proposed tax is substantial, although it must be taken into account that 
part of the existing taxes may already serve the same purpose.  
                                                
3 Specific studies are e.g. Stutzer (2004) analyzing the effect of the income level in the 
community of residence on people’s income aspirations and life satisfaction; Luttmer (2005) 
examining how reported well-being correlates within neighborhood income; de la Garza et al. 
(2010) estimating subjective well-being as a function of both own and self-reported reference 
wages; and Winkelmann (2012) analyzing regional variation in income satisfaction as a 
function of the prevalence of luxury cars in the area. For a survey see Clark, Frijters and 
Shields (2008). 
4 In economics, the importance of status effects has also been emphasized by Hirsch (1976), 
Sen (1983), and more recently by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
Nicholson (1998), Loch, Huberman and Stout (2000) and Huberman, Loch and Önçüler 
(2004) have provided more specific analyses in the work context. 
5 Studies in the optimal tax framework are e.g. Oswald (1980), Tuomala (1990), Ireland 
(2001) and Allgood (2006). See also Weisbach (2008). 
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However, the idea of taxing positional externalities has several limitations. 
 Ineffective Taxation 
The government may be unable or unwilling to tax income or consumption according 
to the positional externalities produced. It may well happen that most of the positional 
externalities remain because the rich have more opportunities to circumvent taxation 
than the middle and lower classes. Moreover, as a side effect the distribution of the 
after-tax disposable income would be more unequal.  
Welfare Decreasing Effects of Taxation 
The higher tax induces distorting effects in the economy. The negative incentive 
effect on work effort of the higher taxation of income or consumption is desired, 
because it internalizes status externalities. However, raising taxes is likely to induce 
individuals not only to supply less labor in the official economy, but also to evade 
taxes by switching to the shadow economy (see Schneider and Enste 2000, Enste and 
Schneider 2002). Cheating on taxes is expected to increase in general. The induced 
distortions in resource allocation undermine the internalization of status externalities 
and may cause overall welfare to decrease. 
The two aspects just mentioned have been treated extensively in the economic 
literature and will not be discussed further here. Instead, we emphasize a third aspect 
that addresses quite a different point. 
 Individuals as Status Seekers  
As a result of evolution, man is genetically disposed to seek differences in position. 
Striving for status has been inherited from the early humans (Henrich and Gil-White 
(2001), a fact well supported by evolutionary anthropology (e.g. Chapais 1991, de 
Waal 1989); by evolutionary psychology (e.g. Tooby and Cosmides 1992, Barkow 
1975, Stevens and Price 2000); and by various sociological theories (e.g. Bales 1953, 
Blau 1964, Stryker and Stratham 1985, and Ridgeway and Walker 1995, de Botton 
2004).  
The scholars advocating taxes on positional externalities disregard an important 
consequence of this general desire for status differences. When one outlet for status is 
blocked, individuals actively seek other possibilities of differentiating themselves 
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from others. Even if the taxation of income and consumption were successful in 
undoing the negative positional externalities, individuals would try to distinguish 
themselves from other individuals in other ways. The crucial question is whether the 
positional externalities in these other dimensions are weaker or stronger (see also 
Clark in this volume on social comparisons in different life domains). If they are 
weak, the taxation of income and consumption differences may be warranted. On the 
other hand, if the negative external effects produced by differences in other ways are 
strong, the taxation of income and consumption differences may be ineffective or 
even counterproductive.  
The Behavior of Status Seekers 
Individuals actively seek new dimensions for distinction, often in a creative and 
imaginative way. As discussed above, when the income and consumption dimensions 
are blocked by high taxation, individuals endeavor to differentiate themselves on 
other dimension. Here is a selection of some possible dimensions: 
Political power. The difference in rank with respect to political position is probably as 
old as mankind. There have always been “ins” and “outs”, “powerful” and 
“powerless” persons. 
Awards. Some people acquire distinction by receiving orders, titles, medals and other 
conferred signs of distinction (see Frey 2005, 2006), and others receive none. 
Education. The differences between individuals in the extent of formal education are 
large even within one country. They range from a few years of basic education to 
postgraduate university studies.  The better educated clearly have a higher status. 
Other activities. Individuals can seek distinction by engaging in activities outside 
economics and politics. Important ways to acquire distinction are sports, the arts, 
scholarship, social and voluntary activities, and also merely being a “celebrity”.  
Leisure. Individuals may seek to distinguish themselves relative to others with respect 
to the amount of leisure time and the type of activity. Frank and Layard assume that 
when either income or consumption is taxed, individuals take more time for leisure. It 
is interesting to note that the evaluation of work time and leisure has changed 
dramatically over recent centuries. In the 18th and much of the 19th centuries, the 
upper class distinguished itself by having substantially more leisure than the lower 
 12 
class, which had to work extremely long hours. Veblen (1899) therefore called it the 
“leisure class”. Today, the opposite seems to be true. Being overwork is taken as a 
sign of being important or “in demand”, while having time available is considered 
close to being unemployed.  
Ideas of the “good life”. Individuals may seek to distinguish themselves by leading a 
“good life”. They may engage in meditation and other philosophical, religious and 
esoteric endeavors. Buddhism and other Eastern philosophies have recently become 
popular, and of course there is also a long Christian tradition exemplified by religious 
orders (such as Cistercians, Trappists or Carthusians). In contrast with some of the 
other dimensions mentioned above, individuals who practice these philosophies or 
religions rarely consider themselves to be of “higher rank”, but they are certainly 
aware that they distinguish themselves from other individuals. Indeed, the latter are 
often willing to accept that those leading a “good life” are superior, and they rarely 
express any misgivings about this. Few positional externalities appear to be created by 
resorting to a “good life”. 
Consequences for Economic Policy 
A first assessment of the question of whether positional externalities due to 
differences in income and consumption should be (highly) taxed depends on the two 
well-known effects on work incentives and the capacity and willingness of the 
government to attain the desired reduction in status seeking behavior via higher 
taxation. The larger the induced distorting effects of taxation, and the lower the 
government’s ability and willingness, the more damage is done by intervening in the 
economy via such taxation (see also Weisbach 2008).  
Even if the two conditions were fulfilled, the normative case for taxing positional 
externalities depends on whether individuals seek to re-establish their ingrained desire 
for status differences by substituting with dimensions that are subject to high 
positional externalities. The externalities created may even be higher than those for 
income and consumption. Positional externalities that relate to political positions, 
awards, education, achievements in sports, the arts and academia, leisure, and to ideas 
of the good life also have to be taken into account. While some of these dimensions 
are currently not considered relative (see e.g. Solnick and Hemenway, and Carlsson et 
al. 2007), they might become more positional if consumption is heavenly taxed. Thus 
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the normative case for the taxation of positional externalities in income and 
consumption becomes weak if people transfer their drive for status to these other 
dimensions. Moreover, in a dynamic setting, the consequences for the incentives to 
innovate, and thus to generate positive spillovers, have to be taken into account. 
A second assessment of the challenges of positional externalities relates to the 
constitutional perspective. Research in constitutional economics helps us to identify 
which institutions serve the goal of preference fulfillment. Thereby happiness 
research provides insights about how and to what extent institutions have systematic 
effects on indicators of individual well-being. The focus is thus on institutions rather 
than specific policy interventions. In our application, the focus ought rather be on the 
relationship between the fiscal constitution of a jurisdiction and people’s subjective 
well-being than on the optimal tax scheme in terms of happiness.  
While we are starting to understand positional externalities as a phenomenon, it is 
premature to draw policy conclusions as there is a severe lack of comparative 
institutional analyses that take them into account. 
 
III. Conclusions 
Happiness research in economics has made great advance. In addition to seeking to 
explain the determinants and consequences of happiness, more and more effort is 
made to derive implications for policy. This is a welcome development. However, we 
have to take care not to run into danger of applying happiness research in a simplistic 
way. Moreover, we think that it is tempting to apply happiness research in a 
technocratic way (see also the contribution by Sugden and Teng in this volume). This 
is best visible in the idea of maximizing aggregate happiness as a social welfare 
function.  This is, however, a mistaken direction to go. It neglects the insights from 
political economics and fails to reflect the rich insights from happiness research (Frey 
and Stutzer 2012). 
We have alluded to policy consequences in two distinct areas: unemployment and 
positional externalities. Thereby, we put special emphasis on the limitations with 
regard to the recommendations we can draw. In particular, happiness research in 
economics needs to provide further insights about how and to what extent institutions 
have systematic effects on indicators of individual well-being when, e.g., studying the 
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consequences of unemployment and status. The range of institutions under study may 
include self-binding mechanisms, social norms, private and public law (i.e. the rules 
of the game) as well as constitutional conditions on how to choose rules. 
According to this constitutional view (see also Frey and Stutzer 2012), the results 
gained from happiness research are taken as inputs into the political process. These 
inputs then have to prove themselves in political competition and in the discourse 
among citizens, and between citizens and politicians. As an ideal consequence, people 
become better able to advance their idea of the good life, individually and 
collectively. 
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